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BIOORAPHICAL NOTE
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understanding the development of Communist countries, Mr. Neal
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Introduction
The purposes of foreign policy-any foreign policy-are to protect
and preserve a nation and its institutions and to further its goals.
Today, in the case of the United States, this means guaranteeing
our survival in a thermonuclear age and at the same time guarding
us and our ideals against inroads by communism.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that U.S. policy has been
dangerously inadequate on both counts ever since World War 11.
With the praiseworthy objective of promoting American security,
U.S.policy has been devoted primarily to ways and means of
"containing" the Soviet Union as well as Communist influence
generally. And what has happened? During the past fifteen years
the Soviet Union has steadily grown not only in economic and
military power but also in world influence, while the area dominated by communism has expanded. At the same time, American
policy has become wholly enmeshed in a nuclear arms race which,
far from promoting our security, has within it the seeds of war and
thus of destruction of our whole civilization.
Never before in the history of mankind has so much been at
stake in the relations between two nations as is at stake today in
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Never
before, and - unless we are both wise and fortunate - perhaps
never again.
For the present sorry state of the world, Soviet policy must bear
a large share of the blame. The U.S.S.R. has often been disruptive,
obstructionist, and uncooperative to the point of paranoia. But it
is not enough to condemn Soviet policy. It must be coped with.
And a solicitous concern for the very objectives we seek to further
makes it necessary to state that the responsibility for today's

dangerous international situation must also be shared in no little
degree by American policy. To the extent that our own policy is
faulty, to the extent it has misread Soviet capabilities and intentions, to the extent it has failed to take advantage of possibilities
for promoting both American security and peace, our duty as
Americans is to seek to correct it.
Since the end of the war, there has been no serious, thoroughgoing reevaluation of the basis of American foreign policy. The
plea of this paper is that the very life of our nation-to say nothing
of many other nations-depends on such a reevaluation, on a
dispassionate restudy and rethinking in terms of the realities of
the nuclear age. Particularly, this involves a fresh look at the
Soviet Union. There has evolved an American image of the Soviet
Union that is not only distorted but hardened beyond reason.
Noting this, Professor Berman of the Harvard Law School points
out that there are accurate, objective analyses of the U.S.S.R. but
that "American readers . . . all too often simply reject, subconsciously, those images which conflict with their preconceptions."
At official as well as unofficial levels, American attitudes toward
the Communist Colossus have become befogged in a miasma of
fear and emotion. It is imperative that they be clarified; not,
indeed, with any thought of approval of the Soviet system or of
communism generally, but because our continued misunderstanding of the Russians in fact serves the cause of communism rather
than of freedom and at the same time fosters policies on both sides
that increase the risk of nuclear war and mutual destruction.
Our general policy toward the Soviet Union has been based on
two major and unquestioned assumptions: first, the assumption
of the constant and inevitable danger of Soviet military aggression:
and, second, the assumption of the inevitability of American military superiority. In addition, there has been a third widely held
assumption: that the Soviet system, that communism generally,
could not succeed because it was evil. The first assumption led to
the conclusion that negotiating with the Soviet Union on the basis
1. Harold J. Berman, "The Devil and Soviet Russia," The Americun Scholar,
Vol. XXVII ( Spring, 1958 ) ,p. 148.

of mutual compromise-which is the only basis for real negotiations-was useless or dangerous. The latter two assumptions led to
the conclusion that negotiating was unnecessary and, in addition,
possibly morally wrong.
The Sptniki and Soviet ICBMs and rockets brought home to us
that we had misread Soviet capabilities. There is reason now for
serious consideration of the possibility that we have also misread
Soviet intentions as far as military aggression is concerned.
The case for reconsideration appears considerably strengthened
by the fact that the Western and particularly the American record
in judging the Soviet Union hardly warrants a refusal to reexamine
our assumptions. We have been wrong on just about every major
development in the U.S.S.R. since the Bolshevik revolution. We
didn't anticipate the revolution; when it occurred, we didn't think
it would succeed; when it was successful, we thought socialism
was going to be abandoned; when it wasn't, we thought we
wouldn't have to recognize the new Soviet state; when we did, we
acted first as if it was like the Western democracies and then as if
it was like the Nazis; when the Germans invaded, we thought the
Russians could last only six weeks; when they survived the war,
we thought they couldn't recover quickly from it; when they recovered quickly, we thought they didn't have the know-how to
build missiles, and so on. This record would seem to suggest, at
least just a little bit, that perhaps we should not be too positive
in other assumptions we have made.
To suggest that the Soviet Union may not be necessarily militarily aggressive is not at all to suggest that the Russians are or
are likely to be either lovable or cooperative international partners. Pushed by fear, ignorance, and ideology, which often add up
to false views of the world, the Russians are frequently not only
churlish but also in intentional conflict with much of what we
stand for at home and abroad. Their insistence on this conflict,
partly in the hope of fostering communism throughout the world,
is a type of aggression, but in and of itself it is not necessarily
militay aggression.
What are the sources of Soviet conduct, and how have we misread them? To answer this it is necessary to understand two things

about the U.S.S.R. First,it is a dual entity: a nation-state, with
hopes and fears much like other nation-states, and at the same
time it is the center of a world revolutionary movement. These two
aspects of the Soviet Union have sometimes been in conflict, and
when they have been, invariably Soviet national interest has triumphed over Soviet revolutionary interests. Second, Soviet Communists are impelled by-and limited by-ideological considerations to an extent that often eludes the more pragmatic West.
No greater mistake could be made than to assume that the Communists do not believe deeply and sincerely in their basic ideology.
Communist tactics are flexible, but the persistent adherence to
what might be termed operational theory is unquestionable.

Soviet Ideology
There has been inadequate dispassionate study in the United
States of Soviet Marxist theory. Despite much talk about it, there
exists a wide misunderstanding about what it actually says. What
the Bolsheviks under Lenin did was to take Marxism and adapt it
to Russia and the world as they saw it. With certain modifications,
this still forms the basis of their belief.2
2. Of books on Soviet Marxist theory there is no end. For original Soviet
sources, see V. I. Lenin, Marw, Engeh, MancisrrP, and Selected Works,
Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947, 1950-52; J. Stalin,
Problem of L e d n h , Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow,
1947; see also R. N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of CommunkPm,
Macmillan, New York, 1939, esp. pp. 70-83, 150-193; Alvin Z. Rubinstein
( ed. ) ,The Forefgn Poli y uf ths Soviet Union, Random House, New York,
1960, esp. pp. 2-24,3446, 312326; Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism: A
Critical Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 1958, Part I;
Frederick L. Schuman, Russkr Since 1917, Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
1957, pp. 124-130; Mose L. Harvey, "The Basic Tactical and Strategic
Concepts of Soviet Expansionism," in C. Grove Haines (ed. ), The Threat
of Soufet Imperialism, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1955; Julian Towster, Political Power in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1947, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1948, pp. 3-7, pp. 28-34; Robert V. Daniels ( e d . ) , A Documentary Hbtory of Conmunim from Lenin to Mao, and Alfred G. Meyer,
Cornmunimn, Random House, New York, 1980.

The theory teaches that capitalism will fall of its own internal
contradictions and that communism will ultimately pervade the
whole world. The victory is seen coming country by country,
through the revolutionary efforts of the respective Communist
parties, possibly aided and abetted by the U.S.S.R. But the doctrine holds that revolution as such is not exportable, that it must
be generated initially from within when what Lenin called the
"objective conditions" for revolution are present.
Nowhere in the whole body of Soviet Marxist theory is there
the implication that the Soviet Union, for ideological or any other
reasons, should itself initiate a war. This does not mean, of course,
that there are ideological barriers to the Soviet Union's euer initiating a war, that it will not, under any conditions, utilize military
force to promote its security, or that the Communists have especial
devotion to peace as an ideal. Indeed, in former days, they talked
of utilizing a war-started by somebody else-for furthering their
goals. What is being said here is only that there is no ideological
compulsion to military aggression. Soviet doctrine foresees communism coming to the world through other means than military
conquest.
Even this vision of a Communist world, however, does not
embrace the goal of domination of the world by the Soviet Union
as such. In Soviet theory, world communism has never been
equated with a world under the rule of the U.S.S.R. In practice,
extension of communism is likely to mean extension of Soviet
influence, at least initially, and in some cases-as is true of the
Eastern European satellites-Soviet domination. But at the same
time the cases of Yugoslavia and China indicate that communism
by itself does not necessarily mean Soviet domination.
It is true that at one point Lenin saw armed conflict between
communism and capitalism as inevitable and that he talked of
using Soviet arms in the struggle. But it is necessary to recall that
Lenin expressed these views during the Bolshevik revolution, at
a time when the capitalist powers were actually invading Russia
and when he naively believed that the fall of capitalism generally
was right around the comer. Indeed, at that time the Bolsheviks
by and large considered the revolution in Russia as important

mainly because they saw it as the beginning of revolution everywhere. On the other hand, the Comintern-the international organization of the various Communist parties once described by
Lenin as a "general staff for world revolution"-was formed during
the capitalist invasion and initially served primarily as a device to
strike at the enemies of the Soviet state by "fifth column" activities
behind the lines. The Comintem was a failure in terms of promoting world revolution and quickly degenerated into an arm of
Soviet foreign policy.
Warlike quotations from Lenin and others, uttered during the
revolutionary period, are still frequently cited-usually out of historical context-in an attempt to show the militarily aggressive
nature of the Soviet UnionY3but after the end of the civil war in
Russia no such remarks have been made by any responsible
Soviet leader.
Not only that, but a series of false quotations attributed to Lenin
and his cohorts have wide circulation in the United States, and
even books based on them have been written. Many well-meaning
citizens use them in all sincerity. Governor Rockefeller, for example, in an address to the New York Republican Club during the
1980 presidential campaign, drew on this body of apocrypha to
quote Lenin as saying: "Our immutable aim is, after all, world
conquest." Another often-cited spurious quotation has Dimitry
Manuilsky, one-time head of the Comintern, saying that the Communists will lull the capitalist countries with talk of peace and
"as soon as their guard is down we shall smash them with our
clenched fist."
By 1921, Lenin had come to see that capitalist stability was a
long-run phenomenon, and that it was necessary not only to get
on with the building of the Soviet state but also to "coexist" with
capitalism. In the meantime, however, the Soviet view of the world
came to be based on the concept of the inevitability of capitalist
3. For example, see Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, 1953, p. 285.
4. See Abraham Brumberg, "Apropos of Quotation Mongering," The New
Republic, August 29, 1960, pp. 15-16. Mr. Brumberg is executive editor of

the State Department's bi-monthly Problems of

Communism.

hostility. This concept has remained the pivot of Soviet foreign
policy. It is what makes the Russians probably even more suspicious and fearful of us than we are of them. It does no good
whatsoever to say or even to "prove" that such Soviet suspicions
of us are wrong. They exist. They are imbedded deeply not only
in Soviet ideology but also in the Russian past. This is the view
they hold. It is ingrained in them. Moreover, they can cite instance
after instance which, they feel, confirm their fears. One cannot
hope to understand Soviet conduct in any meaningful fashion
without consideration of these fears.

Basis of Soviet Fears
First there was the invasion of Russia and Siberia by the United
States and other capitalist nations at the time of the Bolshevik
revolution. The Russians have never forgotten it. This was followed
first by Soviet exclusion from the Versailles Peace Conference, and
then by the cordon sanitaire, with which Clemenceau hoped to
protect the West "from the germs of Bolshevism in the East." The
cordon sanitaire m-t
non-recognition of the new Soviet state
and establishment on its borders of nations with an anti-Soviet
orientation."
Excluded initially from the League of Nations, the Soviet Union
perforce opposed the League's scheme of collective security and
followed a policy of bilateral negotiations where it could. When
the U.S.S.R. signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany, Western
Europe's answer was the Treaty of Locarno, bringing Germany
5. For a discussion of these matters, see George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves
the War and The Decision to Intervene, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1956, 1958; William A. Williams, American-Russian Relations,
1781-1 947, Rinehart and Company, New York, 1952; and Hugh SetonWatson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, Cambridge University Press,
London, 1945, pp. 362365. See also comments by John Maynard Keynes,
The Economic Consequences of Peace, Harcourt, Brace and House, Ncw
York, 1920, pp. 288-291.

into the League and, it was hoped, into the West. Apprehensive
of rising Nazi power, the Soviet Union joined the League in 1934
(at the urging of France, which was also experiencing uneasiness
over the Germans) and accepted a policy of collective security.
Almost at this very moment, however, the French and the British
were abandoning collective security for bilateral appeasement-of
the Italians, of the Japanese, and of the Germans. The Munich
conference, which excluded the U.S.S.R. despite its treaty relations with both France and Czechoslovakia, gave the Nazis the
green light to move eastward into Czechoslovakia. Rightly or
wrongly, the Russians regarded it as an attempt to trap them.
When, sidestepping the trap, they signed a treaty with the Nazis,
they were denounced by the very people who had made an agreement with the Nazis at Munich. Meanwhile, the Russians were
engaged in Far Eastern Siberia against Japanese aggression under
circumstances that they felt indicated Western connivance."
Certain it was that subsequent Soviet actions against Poland,
against the Baltic States, and against the Finns were ruthless, but
it is just as certain that, in the whole context of European plot and
counter-plot of the times, these actions were explainable by motives other than simply a desire to commit military aggression.
It should also be clear, therefore, that no matter how unpalatable
communism may be, it is a misreading of the Soviet Union to
equate it with Nazi Germany. In addition to the deep ideological
-and other-diff erences between communism and Nazism, communism can and does exist as a force independent of the Soviet
Union, while Nazism existed only for aggrandizement of the
German state. Moreover, the Nazi system was based-both theoretically and practically-on unlimited military aggression and
expansion of the Reich. While the Soviet Union certainly enlarged
its territory as a result of the pact with Hitler, the essentially
defensive nature of its policy stands out. Although Hitler proposed
6. See Frederick L. Schuman, Swid Politics at Home and Abroad, Knopf,
New York, 1946, Ch. VIII; Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia,
Vols. I, 11, Oxford, New York, 1947; Harriet Moore, Souiet Far Eastern
Policy, 1931-1945, Princeton, 1945; and Williams, op. cit., Chs. VII and
VIII.

grandiose plans for carving up the world, the U.S.S.R.'s response
demonstrated that its interests were limited by security considerations and, in addition, were primarily centered in Eastern Europe.'
Even considering capitalist hostility toward the Soviet Union,
however, the Western reaction to the Soviet invasion of Finlanda country, it should be recalled, that had close ties with Nazi
Germany and a strong anti-Soviet orientation-was astonishing.
Already at war with Germany, despite little fighting, the French
and British came within an ace of declaring war on the Soviet
Union. The League of Nations, which had suffered less explicable
aggressions by Italy, Japan, and Germany, then expelled the
U.S.S.R. It was the only member of the League ever to be so
treated. One does not have to accept all Soviet interpretations of
this or other developments to understand how the Russians could
see in them proof that their fears were well based.R

The Cold War
Against this background arose the almost wholly fortuitous coalition of the Anglo-American allies and the Soviet Union. At a time
when they were fighting for their lives, the Russians were so suspicious that they often inhibited well-meant Western efforts at
assistance. That American aid and collaboration continued, and
in increasing volume, made a deep impression on Stalin and his
Kremlin cohorts. Of course Soviet goals did not change, but there
is some evidence that our wholehearted collaboration made inroads on their ideological conviction about the inevitability of
7. See George F. Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1941, Van Nostrand,
Princeton, N. J., 1960, pp. 102-114, and Schuman, op. cit., pp. 370-407.
See also Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (eds.), NaziSoviet Relations, 1939-1941, Didier, New York, 1948, pp. 217-259. For
discussion of the Winter War against Finland, see Anatole G. Mazour,
Finland Between East and West, Van Nostrand, 1956, esp. pp. 84-129.
8. Cf. Schurnan, op. cit., p. 388-389.

capitalist h~stility.~
But not enough. Hardly had the hot war
ended when the cold war began. One factor was the overoptimistic American view of the Soviet Union. Fighting a war in
the name of democracy, we suffered an unwarranted assumption
that because we had an enemy in common with the U.S.S.R. we
also had similar ideas about how the post-war world should be
reorganized. In our eyes, of course, the cold war was caused by
Soviet actions, of which a good many seemed calculated to offend
and frighten the West. In the near-paranoia eyes of the Kremlin,
however, the cold war was caused -by capitalist hostility. Again,
it is by no means necessary to accept this-or any other-Soviet
view. What is necessary is to understand that it exists. Let us look
for a moment at the immediate post-war period as it seems to
have appeared to the Russians.
At each of the war-time conferences, the Russians were importuned to enter the war against Japan, which they agreed to do
three months after the war against the Nazis was over. They kept
their agreement. Two days beforehand, however, the United States,
with no prior consultation, dropped on Japan the atom bomb, the
secret of which it had kept from its Soviet allies. The British
physicist, P. M. S. Blackett, makes a strong case "that the dropping
of the atomic bomb was not so much the last military act of the
Second World War, as the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia. . . ."lo One does not have to agree with
9. A significant indication was the book by Prof. Evgeni Varga, Stalin's economic adviser. Written in 1945, before the onset of the cold war, the book
takes the position that the United States did not behave like a typically
capitalist country during the war, both because of its "coalition government" representing all classes and because of its policy toward the Soviet
Union. When the book actually appeared in 1947, it was vigorously and
officially denounced, but Varga did not recant. lzmeniia u Ekonornike Kapitalizrna v ltoge Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny (Changes in the Economy of Capitalim in the Period of the Second World War), Gospolitizdat, Moscow,
1946. This volume received only slighting attention in the West and its
implications for the theory of capitalist hostility have been almost completely ignored. More tangible evidence was that the Russians were more
cooperative after the war changed in their favor and Western friendship
and aid was less vital to them.
10. P.M.S.Blackett, Fear, War and the Bomb, Whittlesey House, New York,
1948, esp. Ch. 10.

Professor Blackett, however, to consider that if the situation had
been reversed and if the Russians had developed and dropped an
atom bomb without telling us, there would have been serious
repercussions in the United States. Moreover, the United States
then proposed to keep its monopoly of the atom bomb until such
time as Moscow agreed to give up trying to make one and meanwhile submitted to international inspection. While the Baruch
Plan may have appeared to Americans as a magnanimous offer to
give up its atom bomb monopoly, the Russians considered it a
scheme to enforce a "freeze* on their inferiority in atomic power.ll
To the Soviet Union, Western fears of Soviet military aggression
right after the end of the war must have appeared ridiculous as
well as insincere. Although the U.S.S.R. came out of the war with
its armies extended into Eastern and Central Europe as well as
Far Eastern Asia, it was weak. The destruction wrought by the
conflict in both human and material terms was indescribable. The
Soviet people, without adequate food, shelter, or clothing, were
exhausted physically and psychologically. While it is true that the
Soviet army was large numerically, much of it was still unmechanized and intently preoccupied in Germany and Eastern Europe.
Its air force was inadequate. Except for a few submarines, it had
virtually no navy.
As against this situation, the United States ended the war with
its war-making potential not only undamaged but greater than
ever before. It is often implied that the American demobilization
right after the war substantially lessened our comparative military strength. Nothing could be further from the truth. The American air force controlled the skies. The American navy controlled
the seas. American bases, together with those of our British ally,
were firmly ensconced around much of the great periphery of the
Soviet Union. And the United States, and it alone, possessed the
atom bomb.
The Russians felt an understandable pride in their successes
in the war and were determined to play a role in the world com11. Zbid., Chs. 11-13, and V. M. Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, Foreign
Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1948, esp. pp. 257-316.

mensurate with the price they had paid for victory. This meant
a foreign policy that was, from the Kremlin's point of view, essentially defensive, although with a chip-on-shoulder attitude
scarcely designed to win friends. On the other hand, it was
not clear to the Kremlin just how much friendship was being
offered. There had been the atom bomb. Further, during the
war-time negotiations hopes had been held out for American
assistance for Soviet reconstruction. But once the European war
ended, American lend-lease aid stopped. A Soviet request for a
large loan somehow "got lost" in the labyrinths of the State Department. Wartime promises regarding matters vital to Moscowlike revision of the Montreux Convention governing the Dardanelles-somehow proved illusory. Had the Soviet Union reacted
differently from the way it did, it is possible, of course, that some
or even all of these matters would have worked themselves out.
But it should be emphasized that the Russians are not a Western
European people, and that their reactions-from Ivan the Terrible
to Stalin the Terrible and after-have often been considered offensive by many reared in the more gentle and sophisticated culture
of the West. Moreover, Soviet policy now for the first time embraced within its defense perimeter territory outside Soviet borders, i.e., Eastern Europe.

Eastern Europe
During the whole period between the wars, the Soviet Union,
because of its own preoccupation and weakness, action by the
Versailles Powers, and other factors, was virtually excluded from
the arena of international politics. If one assumes that all large
states have certain "core interests" - areas outside but usually
adjacent to their borders which they view as vital to their security
-this exclusion was unnatural. The West may have come to
accept their cordon sanituire as natural, but the Russians did not.
Particduly was this true of Eastern Europe, an area of traditional

Russian concern. To say that this was viewed with disfavor by the
Kremlin is to put it lightly, and by the time of Munich, at least, a
change in conditions in Eastern Europe became an important goal
of Soviet foreign policy. What happened, of course, was that, as a
result of pushing back the Nazi armies during the war, Soviet
troops occupied most of Eastern Europe and then installed their
Communist-dominated regimes subservient to Moscow. Henceforth maintenance of hegemony of some sort became the cardinal
point in Soviet foreign policy. Since Eastern Europe was now a
Soviet core interest, it was not a subject for negotiation any more
than, say, the Panama Canal Zone or the Monroe Doctrine would
be considered as subjects for negotiation by the United States.
Yet it was precisely this Soviet domination of Eastern Europe
which the West challenged, as early as the fall of 1945, and it was
the political conflict over Eastern Europe that constituted the
opening gambit of what we came to call the cold war.
The politics of Eastern Europe are complex and far removed
from Western tradition. Historically, Eastern Europe is not an
area where Westem-type political democracy was practiced or
understood, except for Czechoslovakia. That Soviet domination
was harsh and often cruel and contrary to our moral standards is
beyond question. But if the West considered Soviet actions in
Eastern Europe as a violation of wartime promises, it must be
pointed out that the Russians considered the Western challenge
to their position also as a violation of wartime promises. We do
not have to accept this position to understand it. A reasonable
case can be made, however, for saying that the Russians gave
as much as they got at Yalta and that the agreement concluded
there in 1945 was so ambiguous and contradictory as to make its
fuEllment by both sides virtually impossible.12 In any event, the
.2. Domestic political propaganda in connection with the Yalta agreement has
befogged public understanding of the complex situation in Eastern Europe
as of the war's end. For a good brief description of the facts, see Robert Lee
Wow, The Balkans in Our Time, Harvard, 1956, pp. 248-267. See also
John Snell (ed.), The Meaning of Yalta, Louisiana State University Press,
Baton Rouge, La., 1956; Hugh Seton-Watson, The Eastern European Reuolution, Praeger, New York, 1950, p. 165-166; and Schurnan, op. dt., pp.
503-529.

Russians were in Eastern Europe primarily not through any
acquiescence on our part but as a result of their military position,
and they were determined to remain there. Nothing could have
been done to prevent it, short of another war then and there. It is as
inaccurate to say that we "gave" Eastern Europe to the Soviet
Union as it is to say that the Soviets "destroyed" democracy there.
We could not give what we did not have, and the Soviets could
not destroy what did not exist.
When Americans talk today about "Soviet aggression," they are
likely to have in mind Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. In one
sense these actions did constitute a type of aggression. But one
does not have to approve of what the Russians did to see that it
was not physical, military aggression, in the sense of one state
simply initiating a war against another for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement. This point has been overshadowed by our
emotional opposition to the Soviet Union. A case in point is
Czechoslovakia.
Time and time again, the Communist coup &?tat of February,
1948, in Czechoslovakia has been cited as evidence of Soviet military aggression. Yet the facts are that there were no Soviet troops
in Czechoslovakia at the time of the Communist take-over. The
coup dktat was managed by the Czech Communists themselves,
who constituted the largest political party and parliamentary
group as a result of the free election of 1946. There is no doubt
that the U.S.S.R. spurred them on and gave them advice. It is
true that local political arrangements begun by the Red Army
during its comparatively brief occupation of Slovakia and part
of the Czech provinces toward the end of the war helped lay
the groundwork for the Communists' success. There were, of
course, Soviet troops on the Eastern borders of Czechoslovakia,
as there were American troops on the Western borders. But
perhaps more important than any of these factors in the success
of communism in Czechoslovakia was the traumatic experience
of Munich. To many non-Communist Czechs - who may since
have changed their minds - a 5 i t y with the Soviet Union was
simply preferable to affinity with the West. The bitter fruit of
pre-war anti-Soviet policies was being reaped. That a nation with

the fine democratic past and democratic possibilities of Czacboslovakia fell to communism is deplorable. But whatever it showed,
it did not show evidence of Soviet military aggression.lJ

Stalin's Foreign Policy
The fact is that Stalin's foreign policy was in his view not only
defensive but also non-expansive, except for the security zone of
Eastern Europe. This policy was, of course, primarily tactical.
Having adopted Lenin's view of long-run capitalist stability, Stalin
believed firmly that revolutions had little chance for success anywhere unless, as in Eastern Europe, they were installed under
Soviet aegis." As a result, Stalin not only did not further Communist activities in many areas but actually opposed them. The
reason was not that Stalin was "nice" or "moral," but that he considered them unlikely to succeed and harmful to Soviet interest
as he saw it at the time. This is widely misunderstood in the West.
For instance, the main assumption of the Truman Doctrine was
that the Soviet Union was aiding and abetting if not actually directing a Communist revolution in Greece so as to extend its
domination to that country. The facts seem to be that Stalin not
only did not aid the Greek Communists but had indicated his
13. See inter a h Seton-Watson, op. dt., pp. 179-190; H. Gordon Skilling,
"The Break-Up of the Czechoslovak Coalition, 1947-8," The C a d k n
Journal of ~ c ~ n o m i cand
s Politid Science, Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (August,
1960), pp. 396-412; "The Prague Overturn in 1948," C a d f u n Slavonic
Papers, 1960, pp. 88-114; and Josef Korbel, The Cornmudat Subversion of
Czechoslouakia, 1938-1948, Princeton, 1959.
14. Czechoslovakia was, to some extent, an exception. Stalin's moral support
of the coup &&at there appears to be explainable by the strategic location
of the country in the Soviet security zone, the already powerful position of
the Czech Communists, and fears that Marshall Plan enticements might
bring a Western orientation. The Czech Communists, of course, themselves
wanted to come to power, regardless of how Moscow felt, and it was they
alone who brought it off.

opposition to their revolution. Similarly, the evidence is that he
advised Mao Tse-tung against proceeding with the revolution in
China and refrained from assisting the Chinese Communists until,
as a result of their own efforts, they were successful. And although
he tried to dominate Communist Yugoslavia by other means, when
the break with Tito came in 1948 Stalin's response was not military
intervention but, together with economic sanctions, the ideological
punishment of expulsion from the Cominfonn.15
Even the three instances where Soviet policy utilized force in
one way or another during this early post-war period illustrated
the cautious nature of Stalin's policy. These instances involved
areas-Iran, Berlin, and Korea-where Soviet and American armed
forces confronted each other at the end of the war and where the
lines of demarcation were sources of political conflict. In Iran,
although the Russians tried to create political conditions in their
wartime occupation zone favorable to them, they did withdraw,
even if reluctantly, with the job unaccomplished. The Berlin
blockade was a maneuver in the cold war game being played by
both sides in Germany. However unwarrantedly, Moscow saw it
as a parry to our thrust. Stalin was outmaneuvered, but his very
backing down illustrated his caution.
The origins of the Korean war are complicated and unclear.
The invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans could hardly
have taken place without Soviet approval if not Soviet initiative.
But to say that this invasion was an act of military aggression does
not lessen its defensive overtones. The strategic importance of
Korea to the U.S.S.R. is obvious and historic. In Soviet eyes, the
Americans had improperly tried to utilize the United Nations to
unify Korea on their terms. From Seoul, Syngman Rhee had several times reiterated his intention of achieving Korean unity by
force if need be, and it was by no means clear to Moscow, espe15. Our best information on these points comes from the Y u g m h . See especially Vladimir Dedijer, Tito, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1953, pp.
321322 ff. See also Fred Warner Neal, "Moral Responsibility for World
Leadership," Western P o W a l Quarterly, December, 1956, and TitokPm
in Action; the R e f m in Yugoskruta, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1958, esp. Chs. I, 11, XI; and Rubinstein, op. cit., pp. 211 ff.

cially after John Foster Dulles's visit to South Korea just before
the outbreak of hostilities, that the United States would not aid
and abet this objective. That the Russians, to say nothing of the
North Korean Communists-interested as both of them were in
preventing this at all costs-felt two could play at the game of
forced unity is not altogether surprising. If the Korean war indicated other than a purely defensive policy, it also illustrated again
Stalin's willingness to let communism suffer defeat-or at least fall
short of victory-rather than involve the Soviet Union itself in
war.16
Although it came after Stalin, mention should be made here
of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956to put down a revolution.
This was, certainly, physical military aggression. It was a brutal
action, reprehensible in the eyes of most of the non-Communist
world. Yef even this action must be distinguished from the type
of military aggression that the West apparently fears and that
it accuses the U.S.S.R. of being ever ready to commit. The fear in
the West is of aggression to expond the area of Soviet power. The
Soviet aggression in Hungary, on the other hand, was aggression
to maintain a position previously achieved and in an area that the
Kremlin considers its most important core of interest. To make
this distinction in no way condones the Soviet repression in Hungary, but it is a necessary distinction to make if one wishes
accurately to assess Soviet intention on the basis of past performance.
None of this is intended to justify Soviet actions. Any "defense"
of the Soviet Union is incidental to the main purpose of assessing
Soviet policy accurately so as to be able to cope with it better.
To characterize Stalin's foreign policy as defensive is by no means
to say that it was conciliatory or that it sought to promote good
relations with the West. Indeed, often the contrary was hue. The
defensive character of Soviet policy in this period implied no lessening of Soviet hostility toward capitalism or weakening of Soviet
desires for the spread of communism. What is being said here is
simply that Soviet policy has not demonstrated a propensity for
-

16.Cf. Rubinstein, op. dt., pp. 250-!53.

mditay aggression and that the evidence usually cited to justify

the contention that the Soviet Union is militarily aggressive is
without foundation.

The Failure of American Policy
The real failure of American policy was that it was based on the
assumption that there was a constant and overriding danger of
Soviet military aggression when in fact there was not. As long as
we maintained unquestioned military superiority over the Russians, this assumption did not have to be tested. It could always
be said that the Soviet Union refrained from aggression because
of our superior military strength. (In fact, this was said at the
same time that the U.S.S.R. was accused of not having refrained
from aggression.) Thus seemingly secure, we relied more and
more on a military posture, exclusive of much else. This would
have been bad enough had the United States in fact been able to
maintain its military superiority. For one thing, precious years
were lost in formulating adequate policies to deal with the realities
of the social revolution which gripped-and still grips-much of the
post-war world. Unfortunately, while our policies were oriented
to defense against a danger that was not there, Soviet power burgeoned at home and Communist influence-like the Monitor in its
battle with the Merrirnac-sailed on largely uninhibited by our
guns.
When, suddenly, our misreading of Soviet capabilities became
apparent and we realized that we no longer had military superiority over the Russians, the tragic results of these policies loomed
large. We found ourselves in a nuclear arms race that could not
be won, while the problem of nuclear weapons control had become
incredibly more difficult. At the same time, the political issues that
went unresolved while we concentrated on the danger of Soviet
military aggression were now thornier than ever and constituted
growing irritations capable of triggering a nuclear holocaust.

On some Americans this made an impression. The altered situation was one of the factors, for instance, causing George F. Kennan
to abandon the policy of containment he had earlier championed
and, indeed, helped to formulate. His Reith lectures over the BBC
in the spring of 1958 were devastatingly critical of U.S. policy and
especially of our views of the Soviet Union.'? But American
thinking generally and American policy did not change.
The matter of Germany is a good illustration of the problem.
Because we were afraid of Soviet military aggression we had promoted German rearmament and integration with the West. There
never were-and still have not been-any real negotiations with
the Soviet Union on German reunification. It may well be that
the Russians never, under any conditions, would have agreed to a
plan for unification which we could have accepted. But they made
it very clear that the one plan for unification they would not
accept was one that permitted a reunified and rearmed Germany
to become a part of NATO. Since we constantly insisted that any
reunification be of just that kind, we in effect never tested the
Soviet willingness to agree to any other kind. In the words of
George Kennan, "Until we stop pushing the Kremlin against a
closed door, we shall never learn whether it would be prepared to
go through an open door." l8
Meanwhile, our whole European policy has become oriented to
West Germany, which is now our most powerful partner. The
Bonn government has been pursuing a policy of its own, and it is
by no means clear that this policy does not seek to impede rather
than promote a meaningful European settlement. Bonn's attitudes
toward East Germany, toward Berlin, and toward the Oder-Neisse
Line are cases in point. But the United States has lost the power
of initiative so far as Germany is concerned. Even if we did not
agree with West Germany on these issues, we could not take an
independent stand as long as we feel we "need" West Germany.
17. The lectures were published under the title Rush, the Atom and the West,
Harper & Brothers, New York, 1958. Compare with Kennan's initial statement of the containment policy, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign
Afairs, Vol. XXV (1947), pp. 566-582.
18. Russia, the Atom and the West, p. 41.

And that feeling is based on the assumption that a strong NATO
is necessary to protect Western Europe against Soviet military
aggression. Incidentally, in stressing the urgency of making NATO
strong, the 1961 communiques read much like those of 1951.19If
NATO strength is really needed to prevent a Soviet attack on
Western Europe and such strength has not yet been attained after
ten years of effort, one might well ask what the Russians are
waiting for.
There is no question that the major issue at stake in our relations with the Russians involves the nuclear arms race. But that is
not the only one. In some ways almost as important is the issue of
expanding communism and Soviet influence, primarily in the underdeveloped areas. That this is not primarily a military issue
makes it, in the long run, little less significant. The underdeveloped
parts of the world constitute the bulk of the world's area and
population, and it is not too difficult to imagine a future world in
which they will wield great power. To some extent this is already
apparent in the United Nations.
The collapse of Western European colonial power as a result
of the war set off revolutionary currents throughout these underdeveloped areas. The United States was inclined to place the
blame on the Soviet Union, especially where neutralist and socialist-oriented regimes resulted. We failed to understand that while
communism as a revolutionary force and the Soviet Union as a
state may be closely related, they are not the same thing. Our
firm assumption of the aggressive and expansive nature of Soviet
policy blinded us to the reality that even where the Communists
participated, these revolutionary movements were for the most
part indigenously originated and motivated mainly by the desire
for national independence and internal change. The result was
that the United States needlessly dissipated large quantities of
its "reservoir of good will," ultimately to the advantage of the
Communists, and that still we are more often in a position of appearing to oppose rather than to support the new nations. The
19.So do statements of the respective Secretaries of State involved. About
all that is needed is to change the name "Acheson" to "Rusk."

result was also that the United States got itself in a position of
backing questionable regimes-questionable not so much because
they are sometimes '%ad," by our own standards, as because they
tend to lack necessary support from their own peoples. In the case
of colonial regimes, it was, again, our assumptions about Soviet
military aggression that stood in the way of realistic action. We
often felt we could not afford to support anti-colonial movements
because this would alienate our allies, whose collaboration we
considered necessary to help defend Western Europe against
Soviet attack.
Ironically, up until the last days of Stalin, the Soviet Unionisolationist as well as defensive-paid little attention to the underdeveloped areas. The U.S.S.R. all but ignored anti-colonial movements and reacted to "neutralism" with almost as much suspicion
and hostility as the United States. This, as we now know well, is
no longer the case.

Soviet Policy Takes the Offensive
What happened was that in 1952 Soviet foreign policy, still under
Stalin, underwent a great change. It shifted from the defensive to
the offensive. At the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, Stalin proclaimed an end to the long period of
capitalist stability, to the "ebb tide of revolution," and announced
that a "flow tide" had set in. As a result, he called for an abandonment of the essentially defensive policy that had been followed
ever since 1921, and particularly since 1945, and the beginning of
a foreign policy offensive-an aggressive policy, if you please,
although not militarily a g g r e s s i ~ e . ~ ~
The evidence of the changed situation in the world, according
to Stalin, was not only the economic and military recovery of the
20. For Stalin's views, see account of 19th Congress in Leo Gruliow (ed.),
Current Soviet Policies, Praeger, New York, 1953.

Soviet Union, or even the consolidation of communism in Eastern
Europe and China, but also revolutionary developments in most
of the rest of the world, particularly in the underdeveloped
areas.
Nationalism, said Stalin, was now the dominant factor in the
world, and this was being ignored by the capitalist states, especially by the United States with its multi-national and supranational anti-Communist devices. It was, therefore, up to the
Communists to exploit this by picking "up the banner of nationalism where it had been dropped by the bourgeoisie." To do this,
he said, would both promote Soviet security (by breaking up
NATO and other American-led military alliances) and hasten the
collapse of capitalism in general. Stalin advised the Communists
to return to the concept of the popular front, soft-pedal extremist
ideas, collaborate with the Socialists, and fight against colonialism
and for revolution. In the general process, Stalin promised, the
Soviet Union would help weaken capitalism by economic competition and help win over the underdeveloped areas by economic
aid.
Although Stalin conceived his new offensive in non-military
terms, he predicted war-not, he said, between capitalism and
communism but among the capitalist countries. In making this
prediction, Stalin returned to the Marxist theory of war, that war
was an 44inevitable"concomitant of capitalism.
This Marxist theory of war was always the weak link in another
Soviet theory, the theory of peaceful coexistence as conceived by
Lenin and maintained by Stalin. Coexistence, in Soviet theory,
always had a distinctly illusive and impermanent character. Not
only was it conceived as temporary because of the anticipated
inevitable fall of capitalism, but it was futile to talk of long-run
peace because of the inevitability of war. Given, at the same time,
the theory of the inevitability of capitalist hostility, this meant
that there was not only the constant danger but indeed the likelihood that capitalist war would also involve the Soviet Union.
Under such conditions one might coexist temporarily with the
capitalist nations, and even make agreements with them, but
neither coexistence nor agreements were likely to be of long-term

duration, and genuinely friendly relations on a basis of trust were,
in any case, out of the question. Stalin in 1952 called for "peace
tactics" both because he considered this to be popular and thus
an aid to the new foreign policy offensive and because he thought
such tactics "might prevent a particular war." But it was clear
he considered "peace tactics" just that and incapable of preventing war over any long-run period.
Stalin died before there could be much implementation of the
new foreign policy offensive. Yet the line he laid down at the 19th
Party Congress in 1952 began to be carried out almost at once by
his successors. In the meantime, however, there came an extremely
important development-perhaps the most important development
in mankind's history: the hydrogen bomb. Stalin, because he was
either whistling in the dark or ignorant, discounted the importance
of the atom bomb even after the Soviet Union acquired it. But
soon after his death the Soviet Union-no less than the United
States-developed the hydrogen bomb. Not surprisingly, the appearance of this instrument of Armageddon produced some serious
rethinking in the Kremlin about the implications of the new policy
in relation to the theory of coexistence.
The year 1955 was filled with Soviet expressions of concern
about the H-bomb. There was something of a public debate in the
U.S.S.R. about whether it was capable of destroying "all civilization," "only capitalism," or '10th capitalism and socialism." The
most recent as well as the most explicit statement came in October,
1960, from a Soviet General Staff expert, General Nikolai A. Talensky. In the event of thermonuclear war, General Talensky wrote,
"not a single country would escape the ensuing crushing, devastating blows. . . . The world population would be reduced by one
half. . . . Moreover, the most active, capable, and civilized portion
would be wiped out. One should also remember that the material
and technological basis for life would be destroyed." An aggressor
could not hope to survive, even in the event of a surprise attack,
General Talensky declared. And he concluded that it was "impos21. See, for instance, Praoda, Jan. 10, March 5, April 11, June 1, and Oct. 9,
1955.

sible now to use weapons for the solution of political tasks as has
been the case in the course of thousands of years."22
The fact was that the Soviet Communists realized that they
were now faced for the first time with something that was unlikely
to respond to the dialectic, something that threatened them and
all Communist development no matter what they did. They were
also in an ideological dilemma. They had clung to the Marxist
theory that war was inevitable as long as capitalism existed. Capitalism did exist. Therefore there would be war. But war with
H-bombs would, or at least might, destroy everything, themselves
included. The theory was thus one of inevitable doom. Not only
was it an ideological cul-de-sac, but it was hardly a fitting theory
for the exponents of the Brave New Proletarian World.

A New Theory of Coexistence
The result of these Soviet considerations was a new theoretical
position, proclaimed by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress
in 1956, which had enormous significance for Soviet policy and,
in particular, for American-Soviet relations. What Khrushchev
did was to reverse both Stalin and Marx and declare that capitalism
no longer meant the inevitability of war. The main reason he
gave was that even though capitalism meant the continuing
danger of war the "peace-loving, Socialist forces" in the world
were now so strong that they had a chance to prevent it. But he
was also, it is known, motivated by the dangers of the H-bomb
to the Soviet Union. Regardless of his reasons, what mattered was
the new ideological position: war was no longer ine~itable.?~
22. N. Talensky, "On the Character of Modem Warfare," Znternationul
Affairs,October, 1960.
23. For Khrushchev's statement of the new theory, see Leo Gruliaw (ed.),
Current Soviet Policies IZ, Praeger, New York, 1957, esp. pp. 29-63.

This meant above all two things:
First, peaceful coexistence no longer had to be only temporary.
The theoretical inhibitions that prevented the Soviet Union from
thinking of long-term peaceful relations with capitalist powers
had been removed.
Second, it meant a new interpretation of the concept of capitalist hostility. The capitalist powers might continue to think
of coexistence as only temporary-that is, as a prelude to a
military conftict which they themselves would initiate. But it
was no longer out of the question-as it was formerly-for the
Soviet Union to pursue policies calculated to make the capitalists change their concept of coexistence as the Soviet leaders
had changed theirs. Indeed, since the Soviet's new foreign policy
offensive was to be carried forward and might increase international tensions, it was, in fact, imperative for the U.S.S.R. to
work out arrangements to make sure that military conflict could
be avoided.
The importance of this new Soviet theory cannot be exaggerated.
The strength of the Soviet commitment to it was underscored at
the 21st Party Congress in 1959, when Khrushchev announced a
still further ideological break-through: the approach to communism. Traditional Marxist theory sees the achievement of communism in three stages following seizure of power-first, the "dictatorship of the proletariat"; second, "socialism," with political equality under the proletarian state and citizens rewarded in accordance
with their work; and, finally, "communism" itself, with the state
"withering away," economic plenty, and citizens rewarded according not to their work but to their needs. Stalin had proclaimed
the socialist stage in the Soviet Union in 1936. The Communist
stage-a sort of "pie in the sky by-and-by"-was always in the
unforeseeable future. Furthermore, visions of communism had
always seen it only on a world-wide basis.
In 1959, however, Khrushchev declared that the U.S.S.R.-alone
-was on the verge of entering the Communist stage: a sort of
"communism in one country." Communist economic plenty, he
indicated, would be no consumer's cornucopia in the American
fashion but simply satisfaction of essential consumer needs by

Soviet standards?' To prove that he really meant it, Khrushchev
literally inundated the Soviet Union with propaganda commitments to overtake U.S. production in certain key items.
Such promises of limited economic plenty in the U.S.S.R.whether American production is actually equalled by 1970 or notis within the realm of possibility, but only on one condition. The
condition is that substantially fewer resources than at present be
devoted to military purpose^?^ But given the present state of the
world, with hostile capitalist countries and H-bombs seen lurking
behind every launching pad, a major curtailment of resources
devoted to defense cannot be risked unless there is at least some
measure of disarmament. Deterrence is no less important from the
Soviet point of view than from ours. Disarmament clearly is not
possible without agreement with capitalist countries. And meaningful agreements with capitalist countries are not possible unless
Soviet policy is couched in terms of indefinite peaceful coexistence.
In the Soviet view capitalism will, of course, fall anyway sooner
or later, and in the meantime the U.S.S.R. can work in a non-military way to hasten its demise.
Thus there emerged a new concept of coexistence. What was,
in one sense, only a temporary tactic for Lenin and Stalin has
become for Khrushchev a basic, strategic doctrine, necessary in the
interest of the Soviet Union both as a state and as the center of a
world revolutionary movement.
All this does not necessarily mean that all Soviet proposals for
disarmament are meaningful and not propaganda. The Kremlin
is still playing the game initiated by Stalin of trying to break down
American military alliances and win support of the uncommitted
countries. But it does indicate that all Soviet proposals for disarmament are not necessarily propaganda and that there is little doubt
24. See Pruudu, Jan. 28, 1959. Translation of Khrushchev's declaration is
given in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XI, nos. 2 and 3.
25. For estimates of possible increases in Soviet consumer goods resulting
from disarmament, see P. Mstislavsky, New Times, No. 1 (January,1960),
pp. 10-12. See also Oleg Hoeffding, "Substance and Shadow in the Soviet
Seven Year Plan," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXVII, no. 3 (April, 1959),
pp. 399-400.

about the earnestness and sincerity of the Soviet desire to limit and
control arms production and to eliminate thermonuclear weapons
and the deadly dangers for everybody that their existence creates.

The Limits of Soviet Compromise
Although this attitude presumably s i g d e s a wider area of possible compromise on the part of the U.S.S.R., there are still at least
three irreducible minima in Soviet policy where to the Soviets
compromise is out of the question, and it is important for Americans to understand them.
First, the new Soviet position means no abandonment of Soviet
efforts to further communism by non-military means, especially in
the underdeveloped areas. As long as the Soviet Union remains
the center of the Communist movement, there is no possibility that
it will abandon its posture of ideological opposition to capitalism
or fail to work for communism.
Walter Lippmann has understood Khrushchev to say that the
new version of coexistence means that while the Soviet Union may
work to bring about communism in underdeveloped areas, the West
can do nothing about it.26In one way this is correct. Western acceptance of the Soviet view of coexistence would mean no military
intervention in the event of revolution. But similarly it means no
Soviet military intervention. And, meanwhile, there is nothing in
the concept to indicate that the West cannot work against the
development of communism by other means. Furthermore, there
is at least implied the possibility of Soviet abstention in certain
areas of Western core interest, provided, of course, that the West
abstains from interference in areas of Soviet core interest. Particularly, of course, the new Soviet position does not mean no intervention in cases where the United States has already intervened.
26. Walter Lippmann, The Communist W&
1959, pp. 12-13.

and Ours, Little, Brown, Boston,

This was roughly the situation in Laos where in 1960 the neutralist
government of Prince Souvanna Phouma was overthrown by forces
actively assisted by the United States.27Soviet assistance to Communist and other forces opposed to the successor government was
thus a response to American initiative. Of course, as in the case
of Laos, where the government we helped overthrow was not a
Communist government, "communism" in any narrow sense is by
no means always the issue. In Laos the Communists were actively
involved in the opposition to the pro-Western government and
presumably even dominated it. As far as is known, however,
Soviet aid was not accompanied by Soviet personnel, and it is by
no means certain that the Russians were able to dictate to the
rebel forces regarding details of a cease fire, etc. Relations between
Soviet policy and Chinese policy in Laos may have been a factor,
but they are not clear. It is, in fact, entirely possible that Soviet
intervention in Laos was a restraining rather than an aggravating
influence.
Secondly, the Soviet Union will under no conditions niake any
agreements or take any steps deleterious to its hegemony in Eastern Europe or cease to object violently to any indication of
interference in this area. On perhaps no other single point is the
U.S.S.R. as sensitive. As long as the Soviet Union remains a nationstate, it will see Eastern Europe as a core interest, and core interests
are, by definition, non-negotiable. The earnestness of Moscow's
intentions here was indicated by Soviet willingness to jeopardize
much of the propaganda value of its new foreign policy approach
by putting down the Hungarian revolution with force. Despite the
importance placed on appearing as peaceful and wooing the Social
Democratic parties, the Yugoslavs, and the other neutral nations,
there was little hesitation in choosing between these objectives
and crushing potentially hostile forces in a key Eastern European
nation.
Finally, the Soviet Union will not give up or jeopardize its dictatorship at home and permit the degree of freedom enjoyed in
27. The New York Times chronicled the American military build-up in Laos,
but this was largely forgotten in the 1961 crisis. See issue of the Times
for Jan. 9, 1961, p. 13, for a good report on U.S.intervention.

many places in the West. This point has particular relevance in
connection with nuclear weapon agreements. The U.S.S.R. tends
to look askance at proposals for complete and unfettered inspection by foreigners. There are two main reasons for this. First, the
Kremlin certainly fears that unlimited inspection might endanger
its closed system and expose examples of both backwardness and
political repression which it prefers to keep hidden. Second,
inspection runs hard against their ingrained feeling of hostility
toward capitalism which, despite possible new interpretations,
continues to color Moscow's policies. Regardless of what the West
does, the first impediment is not likely to be removed for some
time. On the other hand, the Russians have indicated that a
Western commitment to total disarmament would overcome the
second impediment, and that in that case the first one would not
be a barrier either.28 The point is that the Soviet Union thinks
it has valid reasons for a reluctance to accept unlimited inspection. It is important to note that these reasons have
nothing to do with any intention to violate an official testing or
disarmament agreement.lQThis does not mean that any given
Soviet position on inspection-for instance, the troika or unanimous agreement idea-might not be changed. But it does
suggest that there is no necessary contradiction between the
U.S.S.R.'s professed desire for disarmament agreements and its
reticence about inspection.
Regardless of what we may think about these Soviet irreducibles, almost certainly they are irreducibles and will remain so for
the foreseeable future. It is difficult to see how anything the West
can do could alter them. Is not the West faced, therefore, with
the choice between accepting these conditions and rejecting entirely the new Soviet view of coexistence?
28. See Khrushchev statement in New York Times, Sept. 27, 1960, p. 1, and
disarmament proposal to Geneva conference by Semyon Tsarapkin, the
Soviet delegate, Los Angeles Times, June 30, 1961, p. 1.
29. John Scott, assistant to the publisher of Time, a man of long experience
and considerable expertise in Soviet affairs, is among those holding the
same opinion. See his editorial in the Ridgefield, Conn., Press, March
17, 1960.

The U. S. Response to Coexistence
We now come to the situation in the spring of 1960. There is little
doubt that Khrushchev saw in the post-Dulles American foreign
policy and in his relations with President Eisenhower indications
that the United States was ready to accept his revised coexistence
concept at its face value. Such encouragement was all the more
important to him as there was opposition to the revision from the
Chinese Communists and, apparently, from some of his colleagues
in the Kremlin. The Chinese, in particular, charged on the very
eve of the U-2 incident last spring that there was "no change at
all in substance in U.S. imperialist policy, the policy carried out
by the U.S. government and by President Eisenhower personally." 30
At this point came the U-2 affair. It could only be interpreted
by Khrushchev to mean that his whole new policy was being
rejected out of hand by the United States and in a way seemingly
almost calculated to give ammunition to his critics.
It still seems incredible that-whether as a result of misfeasance,
malfeasance, or nonfeasance-the May U-2flight was permitted
on the eve of a Summit meeting at which, presumably, we were
going to discuss possible settlements with the Soviet Union. But
regardless of the unfortunate timing, the ever-suspicious Russians
were bound to read in it aggressive rather than defensive intent.
The chief American explanation for the U-2 flights is that they
were "necessary" to give us information for guarding against surprise attack. It is true that all kinds of intelligence can be useful
in formulation of policy. Given the Soviet view of American
policy, however, it is easy to see how information of the kind
apparently sought by the U-2would be considered primarily the
sort needed not to prevent but to initiate a surprise attack. This
so-called "strike first" offensive policy must be based on accurate
knowledge of missile installations in the target country so as to
30. The official organ of the Chinese Communist Party is quoted by Harrison
Salisbury in "Haunting Enigma of Red China," New York Times Magazine, June 12, 1960, p. 74.

be sure to prevent, or at least to minimize, subsequent retaliation.
On the other hand, the proclaimed American preventive policy of
deterrence, or "strike second," has been based less on pin-pointing
military targets than on the ability to deliver "massive retaliation"
in the form of a nuclear broadside that would devastate the entire
area of the nation that had attacked us first.
It does no good to tell the Russians that American policy does
not contemplate any surprise attack on them. The important point
is not that it is so but that they understand it. Their doubts about
the sincerity of our fears of a surprise attack on us must have been
enhanced, furthermore, by publication, almost at the very time
the U-2 was shot down, of a U.S. Army analysis of Soviet military
policy which found that the U.S.S.R. not only does not haue but is
not undertaking to build the force needed to carry out a surprise
attack on the United States.31
Furthermore, all this took place in the context of a situation
that Moscow had already interpreted as a hardening of U.S.
policy. The Pentagon, the Atomic Energy Commission, and such
high administration personages as Under Secretary of State Dillon
had made it clear they were opposed to any compromises. Whether
or not President Eisenhower had indicated to Khrushchev a willingness to discuss our position in Berlin, as the Summit meeting
neared we appeared to be sharply restricting the areas on which
we would negotiate, not only in regard to Berlin but also in regard
to disarmament. It must be remembered, further, that there had
also been a U-2 flight clear across the Soviet Union on April 9,
1960. ( I t is true that U-2 flights go back several years, but it is by
no means clear that prior to the Spring of 1960 they were not
simply probing flights in the border areas rather than deep into
Soviet territory. ) In addition, the day after the U-2was shot down,
the U.S. House of Representatives adopted without opposition a
resolution urging - as Congress had urged before - diplomatic
action against the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and calling
for 'liberation" even of parts of the U.S.S.Rea2
31.New York Times? May 5, 1960,p. 1.
32.New York Times, May 3, 1960,p. 1.

However, even more important than the U-2flight itself was
the official American attitude toward it. One can only speculate
as to whether Khrushchev had earlier intended to attend the
Summit meeting in a conciliatory spirit. It is possible that, given
what seemed to be a "firmer" American stance, he did not really
want the meeting. But the indication that the flights would continue and the virtual assertion of the Secretary of State, backed by
the President, that we had a right and a duty to continue them
.~~
were guaranteed to produce a violent e ~ p l o s i o n Khrushchev's
violence in Paris was, of course, typically Russian, which is to say
without much finesse; although it should be remembered that he
did give Mr. Eisenhower an opportunity to disavow personal
responsibility for the U-2flights:'
an opportunity the President
did not accept. In any event, the American position as initially
set forth was clearly indefensible by any standards.
The tragedy is, of course, that the American government really
did not mean it, at least in the crude and extreme form in which
the policy was enunciated right after the U-2was shot down. This
was indicated by the President's announcement that the U-2 flights
had been discontinued. But by then it was too late. Moreover, it is
not clear how much, basically, the American attitude toward the
affair did change. Despite discontinuance of the flights, our reaction amounted more or less to one of indignation that the Russians
were indignant. There still does not seem to be appreciation of
the distinction between the ordinary spying in which all nations
indulge-that is, espionage, such as that for which the Soviet
agent, Colonel Abel, was convicted some time ago-and the
sending of an airplane deep into the heart of a foreign country
in an age of nuclear weapons and fears of surprise attack on
both sides.
On top of the U-2 came the RB-47. There is no reason to doubt
the American explanation that the RB-47, a bomber, was actually
outside Soviet territorial waters. But one might well question
what an American bomber was doing even fifty miles away from
33. New York Times, May 10, May 12, 1960, p. 1.

34. New Ymk Times, May 8, 1960, p. 1.

Soviet jurisdiction, and especially at that time. If we wanted to
impress the Russians with our peaceful intentions, was this the
way to do it, so soon after the U-2? Would the American reaction
have been much different had a Soviet bomber appeared fifty
miles off the Keys than it would have if it were over Florida itself?
If all this did not mean that military and other forces that oppose
settlements with the Soviet Union were in control of administration policy, it at least indicated the tragic inability of President
Eisenhower to control his administration. If there were any doubts
about this, they should have been dispelled by the reckless ordering of a world-wide alert of U.S. military forces on the very eve
of the Summit conference.

The Soviet Reaction
to U-2 and RB-47
The whole development produced a strong Soviet reaction and
some reorientation and stiffening of Soviet policy. It was all very
well to say, as did Mr. Lodge, the chief foreign policy spokesman
for the administration during the 1960 Presidential campaign,
that the Russians were simply using the U-2 and related incidents
as an excuse for their new attitude. But the fact is that the U-2
and other incidents did occur and that there was ample reason
for Moscow to regard them as sufficiently serious for a shift of
policy. The change was immediately evident when Khrushchev
appeared at the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of
1960. The best explanation for Wrushchev's unorthodox conduct
there is that he was simply asserting the Soviet place in the sun,
and announcing-almost as a dare-a stronger stand on colonialism. His violent attack on UN-Western policy in Africa ended
possibilities of compromise on the Congo. His demand for a troika
East-West-Neutralist UN executive bespoke a harder attitude in

regard to UN affairs, and this carried over later when the same
institutional arrangement was insisted on for test ban inspection.
On the other hand, Soviet disarmament negotiators continued to
show moderation in their proposals, and Khrushchev was restrained in reiterating his demands for a German peace treaty.
What is more important, however, is that neither then nor later
does there seem to have been any change in the new concept of
coexistence. There is no doubt that Chinese pressure for revision
increased, but the Kremlin maintained its position. If anything,
Soviet polemics about the possibility of averting war and the
necessity of disarmament became more emphaticm3'When the
leaders of eighty-one Communist Parties met in Moscow in November, 1980, the statement they adopted had harsh words about
imperialist aggressiveness, a vigorous denunciation of U.S. policy,
and a strong reaffirmation of the struggle between communism and
capitalism. But the statement emphatically endorsed Khrushchev's
position on war and coexistence and declared: "The problem of
war and peace is the most burning problem of our time.''3Vhe
draft Program of the Soviet Communist Party prepared for the
22nd Congress in October, 1961, was couched in the same terms.
The possibility for agreement thus remained, but it seemed
increasingly clear that if the impasse resulting from the 1960
events were to be broken there had to be American initiative in
terms of proposals not obviously unacceptable to minimum Soviet
requirements. To say this is by no means to suggest that the
United States should "give in" to the Russians on all or even on
most issues. The point is that it is only realism to see that there
are some areas where they are extremely unlikely to be moved
just as there are some areas where we are extremely unlikely to be
moved. The Soviet irreducible minima mentioned above are irreducible not only because of the nature of the U.S.S.R. and its
35. See as examples discussions published during the summer of 1960, Trud,
July 7 , August 30; Kommunfst, No. 10 (July), esp. p. 35; Smetskayu
Rossiya, Aug. 17; Prauda, Aug. 12, Aug. 26, Sept. 15; and Zzvestia, Aug.
14, Aug. 18.
36. Text of the statement published in New York Times, Dec. 7 , 1960, pp.
14-17.

policies but also because they are areas where the West cannot
force the Russians. Were these areas vital to our security, there
would be, of course, no point in negotiating at all. But it is by no
means clear that this is the case.

Areas of Negotiation
What are possible areas of negotiation with the Russians? First
and foremost there are those concerning thermonuclear weapons,
both in regard to a test ban agreement and in regard to disarmament. Negotiations on these matters, which have seemed interminable and have often been acrimonious, survived the U-2atmosphere. Both sides have at times compromised, at times stiffened
positions. In neither of the cases has the Soviet Union taken
intransigent positions or indicated an unwillingness to negotiate
seriously.a7If the United States has doubts that the U.S.S.R. really
desires agreements, the same doubts exist in the U.S.S.R. about
the United States.
The fate of the test ban negotiations is illustrative. In April, 1959,
the Russians made a major concession when they withdrew their
earlier demand for limited on-site inspections subject to a veto
and proposed that a quota be set for the number of such inspections but that such inspections themselves be unrestricted and
veto-free. While the number of inspections remained in dispute,
leading American scientists privy to the negotiations felt there
were no real barriers to agreement. At that time, however, the
United States drew back, raising the question of difficulties in
detecting underground inspections and asking that the ban not
-

37. For discussions of these negotiations, see Joseph Nogee, "The Diplonlacy
of Disarmament," International Conciliation, No. 526 ( Jan. 1960), and
"Disarmament and Foreign Policy," Hearings, Disannanlent Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January-March, 1959, especially testimony of Dr. Hans Bethe (February 2 ) and James J. Wadsworth
(March 25). See also Anthony Nutting, Disarmament, An Outline of
Negotiations, London, 1959.

apply to certain types of underground and atmospheric tests.
Although there was no evidence to support them, American officials began to voice suspicions that the Soviet Union was carrying
on secret underground tests, and the Atomic Energy Commission
called for resumption of tests by the United States.38 The new
administration in Washington then seemed ready to compromise
on the number of inspections. At this point, in the spring of 1961,
it was the Soviet turn to pull back. Ambassador Tsarapkin now
demanded a three-man secretariat comprised of representatives of
the U.S. and Soviet blocs and the neutralists-the troika idea-and
unanimity before inspection could be undertaken. This proposal
was clearly unacceptable to the West.
Any doubts that Moscow had lost interest in a test ban were
dispelled by Khrushchev's announcement that nuclear testing
was to be resumed in the atmosphere above Siberia. There is
much evidence that Washington was ready to begin tests on its
own-underground-and one commentator indicated that if the
Russians had held off as much as a week or two, the Americans
would have been the first to break the unofficial agreement against
testing. This may have been a factor in the Soviet decision. In any
event, soon after the Russians began exploding nuclear devices
in the atmosphere, the Americans followed suit underground.
The Soviet resumption of testing was a dangerous act, whether
it was an irrational one or not. It subjected large areas of the earth
to more fallout. It apparently blasted any hopes of a test ban
agreement. And it increased international tensions. Doubtless it
reflected the general stiffening of Soviet policy-possibly in connection with the Berlin crisis-and it may have involved pressure
from the Chinese. But there were also military factors. Since the
U.S.S.R. had conducted many fewer tests than the United States,
presumably it was behind in weapon development. That the decision was taken - despite international political consequencesto try to catch up indicates its relation to the disarmament negotiations. Aside from the fallout question, the real significance of
38. New York Times, July 31, 1961,p. 1.

a test ban agreement would be as a step toward an agreement on
control or elimination of thermonuclear weapons. The Soviet
attitude on testing seems to indicate a belief that the United
States is not prepared to make an agreement on disarmament.
The disarmament negotiations have revealed deeper and more
serious difficulties than were apparent in the test ban talks. Here,
despite frequent official and press comment, the major problem is
more basic than inspection. As far as inspection goes, the Soviet
Union has proposed detailed plans for virtually unresticted, vetofree inspection. But they have tied it to an agreement that accepts
the idea of complete or "total" disarmament, and on this point the
Americans have repeatedly demurred. We have insisted on working out an inspection system before proceeding to discuss disarmament. There has not been agreement on the inspection
mechanism either, but Khrushchev has repeatedly declared that
if the West will accept the principle of total disarmament he, in
turn,will accept "any kind of inspection." 39 While there may be
valid reasons for holding back on total, across-the-board disarmament at this time, we have not agreed either to the idea of "total"
thermonuclear disarmament in advance of details on an inspection system. On the other hand, the Soviet position has never
rejected partial disarmament. If the West would not accept total
disarmament, Khrushchev has declared, "the Soviet government
is ready to come to agreement with other states on appropriate
partial steps of disarmament and strengthening of security." 40
Perhaps Wrushchev does not really mean his sweeping pledge
about accepting "any kind of inspection," but, of course, we shall
never know if we do not take him up on it. That we have not,
despite the advantages it might offer in terms of propaganda
39. See New York Times, Sept. 27, 1960, p. 1; Prauda, Jan. 18 and May 10,
1961. For statement of this position to the Geneva disarmament conference by Soviet Delegate Tsarapkin, se2 Los Angeles Times, June 30, 1961,
p. 1.
40. Prauda, cited in The Current Digest
( January 14, 1959 ) .

of the Soviet Press, Vol. X,

no. 49

value if nothing else, casts doubts on how seriously the United
States really desires an agreement. These doubts cannot be completely dispelled with ease because, given overall American policy,
our position is ambiguous. We want agreements in principle but
only if they can be had "without risk." Quite honestly fearing
Soviet aggression, the major American policy-makers disagree
with President Eisenhower's chief negotiator, James J. Wadsworth,
who expressed his belief that "the Russian government has every
intention of living up to any agreement they may make from the
standpoint of nuclear tests or the larger area of disarmament."
These officials also deny George Kennan7s point that "the best
security we can have against violation will not be the inspection
provisions themselves . . . but the absence of incentive to violation."" The logic of their position, given the fact that a really
"foolproof" inspection system is technically impossible, is that any
disarmament agreement would jeopardize our security. Instead of
disarmament, the American preference is for "arms control." This
would, hopefully, minimize the risk of war and at the same time
constitute an "enlargement of the scope of our military strategy."
Such a concept is unacceptable to Moscow and to many others
who feel that anything short of complete elimination of at least
all thermonuclear weapons would not deal with the main problem.
(This reluctance to accept disarmament as a goal may also
reflect fear that without arms the United States cannot halt development of communism arising internally in backward countries.
Such fear is both unnecessary and unbecoming to citizens of a
country with the ideas and capabilities of the United States. The
resulting rejection of disarmament as a goal is also irrational,
because armament in itself cannot halt development of communism. This is true not only of thermonuclear weapons but also
of "conventional" armament. Development of communism can be
41. Mr. Wadsworth's opinion was quoted in the New York Times, Jan. 18,
1961, p. 6.

42. See Hearings, Disarmament Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 86th Congress, 1st session, Part 2, Feb. 4, 1959, pp. 205-207.

43.Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and A m Control,
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961, p. 1.

halted only by providing a better alternative. The apparent American emphasis on "guerrilla" warfare is only another indication of
our failure to grasp the reality of the social revolutionary impetus
that grips the underdeveloped areas.)
Nothing said here should be construed as advocating that the
United States give up its military strength while the Russians
keep theirs. But one does not have to advocate unilateral disarmamentPeoranything like it, to see that there are any number of steps
we could take without jeopardizing our security. Among them,
for example, is a plan for cautious phased or graduated unilateral
curtailment of our military posture, with very small steps taken in
the beginning, with invitations to the Russians to follow suit, and
with the understanding that the procedure can be halted at any
point. Imagination and more imagination, in both word and deed,
is what is needed to break the deadlock. Nothing can be done,
however, until it is realized we are not in a chess game but in a
deadly maze from which we must break out or perish.
Furthermore, agreement on nuclear weapons is inextricably
tied up with political settlements, and political settlements are
unlikely without an easing of tension. Here American policy, again
based on the assumption of Soviet military aggression, has shown
no indication of moves toward settlement of issues making for
conflict. It is apparent not only that we are unwilling to discuss
disengagement in any form but also that we are proceeding with
a policy of arming our NATO allies with nuclear weapons. It is
not at all clear that this policy does not apply also to Western
Germany. There is good reason to fear that the results of such a
policy, regardless of its aims, could make any real agreement on
either disengagement or disarmament practically impossible, Furthermore, apparently, there seems to be no thinking about the
future of our bases which more or less encircle the Soviet Union.
There are, after all, only two ways to settle international conflictsforce and mutual compromise. While the United States does not
want to use force, it is not always clear that it wants to consider
mutual compromise.
There is, indeed, grave reason to believe that the American
position on these matters is unrealistic, inflexible, and unimagina-

tive. Basically, our position throughout continues to be conditioned
by our assumption of the constant danger of Soviet military aggression. Sometimes this is modified by defining Soviet policy as
being committed to use ''all possible means" for the expansion of
communism and extension of its power.** As indicated above, this
thinking is based on distorted evidence or no evidence at all and
ignores the strong reasons for considering that the Soviet theory
of coexistence is predicated not on making war but on avoiding it.
Furthermore, the concept of agreements totally without risk has
no validity. As George Kennan put it, ". . . cultivation of the ideal
military posture will always be in conflict with any serious effort
to ease international political tensions." And a policy "not prepared
to make sacrifices and to accept risks in the military field should
not lay claim to any serious desire to see world problems settled
by any means short of war." 45 The risks, in any cas,e, are comparative, and the implication of American policy is that we are in
greater danger from Soviet aggression than from a continuation of
the thermonuclear arms race. Unfortunately, the evidence is to
the contrary.

The Impasse of Berlin
Berlin is a good example of the difficulties that arise both from
past American policies and from our refusal to think in terms of
possible compromise on points of dispute between us and the
Russians. We are perfectly right in refusing to be "pushed out" of
Berlin. Having made commitments-loudly and of ten-to the West
Berliners, o w concern to "save them from communism" is under44. As an example, see the generally moderate study prepared by a ColumbiaHarvard research group for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Foreign Policy: U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, 86th Congress, 2nd session, No. 11 (February 14, 1960).

45. George F. Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited," Fareign Aflairs, Vol.
XXXVIII, no. 3 (April, 1959), p. 199.

standable. But it is no policy at all simply to reiterate that we will
%tand firm," and it is only sophistry to assert that since the United
States is demanding no change in the status of Berlin the issue
arises only because of Soviet aggression and trouble-making. The
. ~is~ nonsense
situation in Berlin is abnormal and i m ~ e r m a n e n tIt
to talk about the Berlin situation as a part of a status quo that
must be maintained. One does not have to agree with Soviet proposals to see that the Russian concern over the presence of foreign
troops stationed far inside one of their satellite states which the
West refuses to recognize is entirely natural. Furthermore, our
position in Berlin is highly untenable militarily, diplomatically,
and legally. Under these conditions the long-continued failure
of the West even to discuss possible compromises on the Berlin
issue was irresponsible.
To see the Berlin question in some perspective, it is necessary
to consider several factors in connection with the whole question
of Germany. First, the raison $&re for our presence in Berlin has
changed not only once but twice. Originally, Berlin, although
more than a hundred miles inside the Soviet zone, was set apart
on the grounds that it would be again the capital of a unified
Germany. Then disputes over quadripartite administration led to
a more formal and legal division of Germany. Certainly responsibility for this dispute must be shared by both the United States
and the Soviet Union. If there was ever any agreement that was
mutually violated, it was the Potsdam agreement on Germany.
We felt we were reacting to Soviet policy, but it was, after all, the
United States that took the initiative in formalizing the split when
we presided over the combination of the Western zones and then
established them as a West German state. The Soviet Union, in
establishing an East German state, was merely following suit.
Subsequent American policy has emphasized what Secretary
of State Rusk, in the summer of 1961, called the "many contradictions and historical fallacies in the present position of the Soviet
46. Both the U.S.and West German governments obviously so regard it, the
latter despite its insistence that no negotiated compromise is possible.
See positions quoted by Walter Lippmann, "What's Not Said about Berlin,"
Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1961, section C, p. 5.

leaders," 47 but has ignored the contradictions and historical fallacies in our own position. The Western assumption that we had a
right to create "our" German state but that the Soviet Union did
not have a right to create "theirs" is so untenable that we do not
even assert it in this manner, let alone try to justify it. Furthermore,
this division of Germany completely altered if it did not destroy
the practical as well as the legal basis for Berlin's separate status
and for Western presence there.
Under the conditions of two German states, maintenance of the
Western position in Berlin became a maneuver in a diplomatic
gambit ostensibly aimed at negotiating reunification. At the very
least, ensuing American policies were just as responsible as Soviet
policies for the fact that there never were real negotiations on
reunification. One can agree even with the American decisions to
rearm West Germany and to insist that a reunified Germany be
included in NATO and still see the logic of the Soviet refusal to
agree. East Germany, although tightly under the Soviet thumb
from the beginning, was not a full Soviet satellite-in the sense of
the Eastern European countries-until sometime after the mid1950's. Before that time, whether in anticipation of an acceptable
reunification or not, the Russians had not insisted on a complete
socialization of East Germany in terms of thoroughgoing nationalization, collectivization, etc. By 1958, however, it seemed clear
that any likelihood of reunification had disappeared. East Germany had become as fully integrated into the Soviet Bloc as West
Germany had become integrated into the Western Bloc. We do
not know whether the Russians were ever really interested in
reunification, but it is extremely doubtful if American policy was,
especially after the creation of NATO. In addition, there was
another factor : West Germany itself. Rearmed and economically
powerful, the West Germans made it clear in 1958 that they would
not permit reunification on the only condition that reunification
was then possible-military disengagement in Central Europe,
compromises between East and West German systems, and definite
exclusion from both blocs.
47. See text of Secretary Rusk$ statement, New York Times, June 23, 1961,
p. 2.

With reunification no longer possible, the rationale of our presence in Berlin clearly could no longer be that it was a maneuver
concerned with reunification. It was at this point that the Russians
began to press their proposals for a change in the Berlin situation.
This Soviet decision must also be considered in connection with
other factors. The Western powers refused to recognize the East
German republic as well as the Oder-Neisse frontier with Poland.
The West German republic, its rearmament growing apace with
its economic development, likewise refuses to accept the OderNeisse line and has been ostentatiously asserting a claim to West
Berlin.
While it is doubtless true that the comparative well-being of
West Berlin constitutes an embarrassment to the Communists, this
alone does not explain the Soviet eagerness for a change. And in
addition to everything else, there is the stake of the East German
Communist leaders themselves. Despite their undoubted subservience to Moscow, now that they have a full-fledged state to
run they have a personal stake in the matter of Berlin in the same
way that leaders of other Communist countries have a personal
stake in developments within their own boundaries.
Given this situation, the Berlin impasse is a source of instability
-and therefore of danger-for the whole of Central Europe. There
is, therefore, nothing unnatural about the Russians' view that such
instability is a danger to their whole position generally. Khrushchev has not made pre-emptory demands. For at least three years
he has continually advised the Western powers of the interest the
Soviet Union attaches to such a change and has agreed to negotiate on counter-proposals.
The status quo in Berlin is by no means vital to our interests.
That it cannot be preserved in any event was illustrated by the
comparative ease with which it was altered when the Russians
and the East Germans more or less walled off East Berlin. Unless
we are prepared to risk war in a vain attempt to preserve something which does not exist and where no vital U.S. interest is involved, some compromise is essential. Several possibilities suggest themselves. Demilitarization with the present division is one.
Joint East-West German condominium is another. United Nations

supervision is a third, and there are others. Even Senator Mansfield's unlikely suggestion of a "free city" guaranteed by both the
Soviet Union and the United States is at least a proposal. Nor has
the question of whether a new Berlin set-up would involve both
East and West Berlin or only West Berlin been ruled out as
something for negotiation.
Given the unlikelihood of reunification, the hard, cold realities
of international politics point to Berlin's ultimately becoming the
capital of the country in which it is located-East Germany-but
we are not being asked to consider that. Compromises are open to
us. To consider them is not appeasement. "To search for an alternative by which war could be averted, without sacrificing the honor
or the treaty obligations of the United States," wrote Arthur Krock,
In one
apropos of Berlin, "is the high duty of statesman~hip."~~
sense, what Khrushchev has been doing is pointing out that the
U.S.S.R. considers its interests jeopardized by the present arrangement and inviting us to join in a search for an alternative. It may
be that we cannot find one. But the question of Berlin is in many
ways like that of German reunification earlier. We shall never
know whether the Russians would accept some compromise
acceptable to us until we agree to discuss one.

U. S. Bases and Eastern Europe
In considering possibilities for settling the sorest points at issue
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the general international political climate must be considered. This climate is
significantly affected by two highly important factors: the constantly recurring matter of Eastern Europe and the question of
American bases around the Soviet Union.
48. Arthur Krock, "Mqnsfield Wrongly Called an Appeaser," Los Angeles
Times, June 27, 1961, part 3, p. 5.

Although American policy no longer is couched in wild and
irresponsible terms like "liberation," it continues to emphasize
the desirability of interfering in Eastern Europe one way or
another, apparently oblivious of the impact this sort of challenge
has on the Kremlin. This American attitude of non-acceptance of
these Communist regimes has virtually no effect on the course of
affairs in Eastern Europe. If there is any way at all that the Soviet
hegemony can be weakened, it is through a lessening of international tension. There is no doubt, for instance, that American
policy toward Germany and the Oder-Neisse Line is an important
factor motivating many Poles and Czechs toward accepting strong
Soviet influence.
It is entirely understandable that many if not most Americans
view the satellite regimes with disapproval. It is less understandable that so many Americans have been led to believe that constant
official expressions of opposition, which in no way eases the plight
of the Eastern European people and if anything makes life harder
for them, serve any good purpose. Can there be justification for a
course which accomplishes nothing but the opposite of its intention and, at the same time, interferes with efforts to lessen the
dangers of a nuclear holocaust? Yet this is exactly the impact of
American policy toward Eastern Europe. This policy may be
largely hortatory, but it is still one of the most significant factors
creating dissension between the Soviet Union and the United
States. It must be reevaluated, not in terms of cheap and dishonest pandering for political support from Polish-American and
similar groups but in terms of the realities of the situation and the
interest of the United Statesn4@
The impact of American bases around the Soviet Union is seldom
discussed in the United States. Convinced of our own devotion to
49. American antics about Eastern Europe are sometimes not only provocative
but also ridiculous. The "Captive Nations Resolution" that passed Congress in 1959 refers not only to the Eastern European countries and to
certain ethnic-national divisions of the U.S.S.R. itself but also to two
"nations" that never existed in any form-"Cossackia" and "Idel-Ural."
See articles in New York anti-Soviet Russian newspaper, Novoye Russkoye
Slouo, b y Gregory Tschebotarioff, June 8 and 17, 1960, and editorial in
The Nation, April 23, 1960.

peace, we have been unable, apparently, to see how provocative
these bases are in Moscow's eyes, even when they have been
utilized for such activities as U-2 flights. Even if one assumes that
the bases once served some purpose, it is necessary to ask whether
they still do today in view of the capabilities of Soviet nuclear
weaponry and rocketry. To what extent does their existence interfere with agreements that might reduce the dangers of the very
war againstwhich the bases are supposed to guard? Can the bases
be maintained forever? And if not forever, how is eventual withdrawal envisaged, and when? Is it possible that a powerful nation
like the Soviet Union, no longer second in military strength, will
indefinitely permit itself to be encircled in this way? Is it realistic
to assume that Soviet reactions to an American militaxy posture in,
say, Iran are any different from what ours would be to a Soviet
base in Cuba?
Our idea, of course, has been to "contain" the Soviet Union.
The bases were established in a period when the U.S.S.R. was in
a markedly inferior position militarily. Today, is not the Soviet
Union likely to be encouraged to try some "containing" of its own?
Is there any reason why two cannot play at the game? The tides
of international politics are never certain. Who knows who may
end up "containing" whom? All these are questions to which
American policy must address itself if it is to seek realistically to
avoid war and serve the interest of the United States.
But what is the interest of the United States? Most of this discussion has implied some compromise in present American positions. The implication is, obviously, that the United States is too
inflexible in some areas and over-committed in others. There is,
of course, no thought of "giving in" to the Russians on any issue
involving vital American security interests, American core interests. The point is, rather, whether American core interests should
not be more carefully defined. Can the United States, any more
than any other nation, have interests of equal significance to its
security all over the globe? To suggest that certain interests are
primary to us and that certain interests of less import to us are
primary to other nations, and to negotiate compromises regarding
these latter areas, in no sense constitutes "appeasement" ( a word

that has been so misused as to connote almost any compromise
with Moscow). It is only common sense to see that an assertion
of global core interests, regardless of the high ideals that may
motivate it, can only bring conflict because of inevitable collision
with core interests of other nations. At best, it will encourage
globalization of other nations' interests. The United States has
military bases in many areas immediately bordering the Soviet
Union. Our position has been that these are necessary for our
security. But do not such attempts to achieve "total security"
inevitably mean the "total insecurity" of other countries? Does the
United States really have a greater security stake in areas immediately bordering the Soviet Union than does the Soviet Union itself?
It is true that for the United States to withdraw its military
bases from some of these areas might result in exposing them over
the long run to Soviet influence and even Soviet domination,
although there is no basis for assuming that withdrawal of American forces in various areas near the Soviet Union would mean that
the Russians would necessarily "move in" physically. On the other
hand, our reliance on a military posture in many countries tends
to interfere with the very domestic political and economic reforms
-and our acceptance of them-that constitute the basic prerequisite for preventing Communist success. (The defense of such a
policy is often raised in moral terms, in terms of our "duty" to
defend democratic values from Communist encroachment. Alas,
the democratic values in some nations with which we are thus
allied exist only in the eyes of American self-interest. However,
the real objection to our support of many regimes is not that they
are undemocratic but that they are untenable.)
It is often asked, "Suppose we do restrict our global interests?
Suppose, for example, we do give up some bases and stop heckling
the Russians about Eastern Europe? What do we get in return?"
We have become so used to the idea that we have a right to global
interests, while the Russians don't, that this is, for many Americans,
a natural question. It is important to realize that we cannot expect
the Soviet Union to "give up" anything simply because we cease
maintaining a position that threatens Soviet vital interests. In order
to imagine how the Russians feel about this, we must think how

we would feel if the Soviet Union had military bases in British
Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Quebec, Ontario, and the West
Indies, while we had no bases at all around the Soviet Union.
Would this produce an atmosphere conducive to trust and to consideration of mutual compromises? Or, assume that we did not
have military bases around the Soviet Union-which we do-and
assume that the Soviet Union did have a military base in Cubawhich it does not. What would we give up as a quid pro quo for
the Russians withdrawing their base from Cuba? Even under the
existing base situation, the comparatively moderate interest the
U.S.S.R. has expressed in the Castro regime has caused indignation and concern in the United States.
The suggestion that we might consider abandoning some bases
is made, of course, in the interest of the United States, not the
Soviet Union. But in achieving a more rational American foreign
policy, better able to serve our own interest, we would also contribute to an international situation in which meaningful agreements would be more rather than less likely, because then the
possibility for mutual compromises would present itself. It is not
proposed, for example, that the United States unilaterally withdraw its forces from Central or Western Europe. But mutual disengagement, in a situation where American bases no longer ringed
Soviet borders, would be a true subject for negotiation. Making it
clear that we would recognize Soviet interests in areas around the
Soviet periphery, also, would be an earnest for seeking assurances
from the U.S.S.R. of hands off Cuba and all Latin A r n e r i ~ a . ~ ~
Of course, we cannot be certain that adequate compromises
would be forthcoming from the Russians, although there is no
reason to assume they would not be, since there is no reason to
assume they are not serious about their fear of nuclear war and
their desire to minimize the danger of it. But because the United
States, by concentrating its efforts, would be in a stronger rather
than a weaker position, we would be the gainer in any event.
50. Cuba is in some ways a sort of Latin American Yugoslavia. Once a new
reorientation was established, we assisted the Yugoslavs and the Soviet
Union assisted the Cubans, although the Russians have not yet set up a
military mission in Cuba as we did in Yugoslavia.

American Psychology
of Non -Acceptance
With our own ideological commitment against communism, such
reconsideration of our policy seems unpalatable to many. And yet
the realities of international politics are full of unpalatable choices.
We accept them, for instance, in our recognition of the necessity of
doing business with Franco Spain and in recognizing French
interest in Algeria, but we do not accept them in connection with
the Soviet Union, where our own security, to say nothing of the
security of the whole world, is infinitely more involved. Why?
One reason, it is submitted, is that the United States has never
really come psychologically to acceptance of the Soviet Union as
a force with which we must deal on a basis of permanence and
equality. Thus, for example, we were unable to accept the real
lesson of the Sputniki, which was not that America was weak, but
that the Soviet Union was strong. This psychology of non-acceptance grew out of fear, ignorance, and emotion. It is fraught with
the most deadly danger. (Almost monotonously, we seem to be
repeating the same pattern in regard to China. Of course the
trouble is not just the U.S.S.R. or just China; it is also communism
as such. )
Only a psychological situation in which we did not really accept
the reality of the U.S.S.R. can explain our inability to realize that
we cannot undertake or threaten action Moscow considers provocative without there being a Soviet reaction. For example,
Khrushchev has frequently warned that countries where the
United States was establishing atomic rocket launching sites would
be destroyed if war were begun against the Soviet Union. He has
also warned countries from which American planes took off to fly
over Soviet territory that they were participating in provocative
action. The U.S. State Department has listed some of these under

the title of "Soviet Threats of Destruction Against the Free
World." 51
It is the psychology of non-acceptance that also inhibits our
ability to compromise and leads to the idea that we can "win" the
cold war. What does it mean, "win" the cold war? That the Soviet
Union will fade away? That communism will disappear? These
are not realistic possibilities. On the contrary, it is altogether
likely that the area committed to communism of some sort will
expand here and there. This is neither unnatural nor fatal. The
West certainly does not have to "lose" the cold war, and if we
base our policies on realism we will not lose it. But we can no
more "win" it than can the Soviet Union. This does not mean that
the cold war can be finally resolved by agreement, if by cold war
is meant competition between the two systems. This competition
will go on indefinitely, pushed by the Communists and also by us,
and we must be constantly alert to the great challenge it presents.
But the danger in remarks about "winning the cold war is precisely that they imply the possibility of a cessation of the competition on the part of the Communists and, therefore, tend to reject
any compromise. Consider, for example, the statement of General
Nathan F. Twining, made just before he retired as chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in the fall of 1960. Asserting our ability to
destroy both the Soviet Union and China if we are attacked,
General Twining said, according to the Associated Press, that the
cold war will go on until there is a clear winner and a clear loser.
And he added: "The struggle is too big, too vast, too deadly for

51. Smiet Aflaiss Notes, No. 242 (June 10, 1960), pp. 1-14. The closest the
Russians have come to "initiating threats" was Khrushchev's statement
that "figuratively speaking" the U.S.S.R. could support the Castro regime
with rocket fire if the United States intervened. New York Times, July 10,
1960. Soon after, however, he backed away from any implication of
contemplated action. Prauda, June 23, 1961.

52. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 29,1960, p. 1.

Courses Other Than Compromise
Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson has termed the idea that
there is no altemative to negotiations "silly." Since, he insists, the
Russians will negotiate "only on their own terms, then there is no
altemative to surrender." The alternative he suggests is "action,"
which he holds, "is often the best form of negotiation." Mr. Acheson
holds forth in this vein in a magazine article,=' but he offers no
more real proposals for negotiation-or action-than were forthcoming while he was Secretary of State.
There are courses other than negotiating compromises with the
Soviet Union, however. The trouble is they are all unacceptable.
In other days, war itself would have been the alternative, since we
might, at least, have won it. But today, when war can only be lost
by both sides, and civilization-ours for sure and likely others, toodestroyed in the bargain, it is no longer an acceptable alternative,
even though it is the one we may get if we are not careful. (The
polemics about what constitutes "survival"-such as those in which
Herman Kahn, for instance, engagess4-hardly rise to the dignity
of discussion. Even given Mr. Kahn's neo-logic, and given his
neo-morality, it is entirely beside the point whether a thermonuclear war would cost 30 million or 100 million American lives
or whether the survivors could in fact survive. The implication
that the American political and economic system could survive
such a war is a denigration of common sense and a grisly perversion of reason. )
Another possible course might be, theoretically, for one side or
the other to achieve such demonstrable military superiority that
the inferior side would give in. Today one still hears talk in high
places that the United States must be "first." The fact is, however,
that there is no longer any assurance whatsoever that the United
53. "Of Men I Have Known: The Russians," Saturday Evening Post, March
25, 1961, p. 31, pp. 69-71.
54. See Mr. Kahn's book, On Thennonuclear War, Princeton, 1961, for
examples.

States can have demonstrable superiority over the Russians for
any period of time. There is no reason to believe that we cannot
hold o w own, but there is no reason to believe that the Russians
cannot hold their own, too. It is sometimes argued that we must
negotiate with the Soviet Union but only after we acquire still
more military strength. Ignoring the fact that those who make this
suggestion are often the same people who earlier felt we did not
have to negotiate because we did have greater military strength,
we should ask ourselves this: What would be our reaction if this
were the Soviet position? Would we, or would we not, be more
willing to negotiate with Moscow if the U.S.S.R. had still greater
military strength? Negotiations aside, even demonstrable superiority is no real safeguard, for the capacity to destroy a nation once
is really the equivalent of the capacity to destroy it fifty times.
This leaves a third possible course: a permanent balance of
strength resulting in a perpetual impasse. Even if puny, finite man
dared talk in terms of permanent and perpetual, this, too, is
unacceptable. Not only would there be a constant struggle for the
impossible superiority-with what dangers from fallout one can
only speculate in horror-but, human frailty being what it is, the
eventual occurrence of "incidents" and "accidents" would be certain. And when membership in the "nuclear c l u b grows-as it is
already growing-even the apparent logic of mutual deterrence
vanishes. The real danger of a thermonuclear holocaust does not
involve intentions of governments or statesmen or soldiers as much
as it involves accident. Given the continued existence of thennonuclear arms, and given simply that man and his creations, both
mechanical and institutional, remain now, as they always have
been, incapable of perfection, sooner or later, with a deadly
mathematical certainty, the explosion will occur.
That is to say, the "balance and impasse" alternative not only
involves a risk of thennonuclear war too enormous to take, since
war is a completely unacceptable alternative in itself, but it is
bound to lead to war."'
55.On this point, see Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton,
1959, esp. pp. 351-352.

Yet, barring a calculated war and barring clear superiority on
either side, it is this "balance and impasse" alternative that we are
asking for by not considering compromises with the Soviet Union.
It is, indeed, what we have now. It is the great and overriding task
of American statesmanship to get us-and all mankind-out of it.
There is still time for decision, but who knows how long it will
be available?
It would appear that a logical American policy, therefore, should
be based on these concepts:
1) Survival depends, if not on disarmament, at least on arma-

ment control agreements.

2) Armament control agreements depend on reduction of international tensions.
3) Reduction of international tensions depends on agreements
between the United States and the Soviet Union.

4) Agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union
depend on mutual compromises.
There is no reason to believe that, given a realistic readjustment
of our policy toward the Soviet Union, agreements cannot be
reached. In any event, there is no alternative to trying.
None of this is to imply that the thermonuclear war is the only
danger we face; it is merely the most overriding one. As indicated
above, the continuing encroachment of communism also poses a
serious danger, although it is different and not as immediate. But
the central idea of this essay is that the way to cope with the one
is also the way to cope with the other. For until we reexamine our
assumption about Soviet military aggression, we can think neither
in terms of armament agreements and reduction of tensions nor in
terms of dealing meaningfully with the problem of the underdeveloped areas, which is where the main danger of Communist
inroads lies. What is needed first of all, consequently, is a new
approach to American-Soviet relations.

Leadership, Public Opinion,
and the Zeitgeist
It must be recognized that a new approach to American-Soviet
relations is limited by domestic political realities. The American
people have been misled to a point where public opinion constitutes a real barrier to the kind of compromises that are so vitally
necessary. We are not stupid, but we are prisoners of our Zeitgeist,
of the atmosphere of the times in which our society is immersed.
There has been inadequate study of the social forces at work in the
mass societies of the modem world, but it is clear that emotion
and illogic and illusion are capable of creating an iron mould not
easily broken through. This is true not only of America. To mention only one other instance, in recent times, we might do well to
consider the case of the French in connection with Indochina.
The French-seeing that their war could not be won, seeing that
it was costing them far more than it would be worth even if they
could win it-were still unable first to negotiate and then to withdraw until the disaster of Dien Bien Phu overtook them. This is
cited in no criticism of France or of the French but only as an
illustration of the rigidity that binds modem mass societies and
makes it difficult for them to reexamine positions once taken and
act on the logic of the reexamination.
In our case the stakes are infinitely higher than Dien Bien Phu
or Indochina. Yet we are bound as rigidly by our Zeitgeist into a
mould that thus far we have been unable to break. What is involved primarily in our situation is a misunderstanding of the
nature of the threat of the Soviet Union and communism. This
idea about the danger of Soviet military aggression is deep in
public opinion and official opinion. It is fed by public statements,
newspaper and magazine articles and editorials, radio and television broadcasts, and even novels, the theatre, and comic strips.
It is in the very air we breathe. It has thus far prevented a real
reconsideration of the basis of our foreign policy.
We would be less than frank in thinking that economic factors

do not also play an important part in this rigidity. It is easy for a
college professor, for example, to advocate disarmament. But it
is not at all easy for one whose day-to-day livelihood comes from
making armaments, even if he sees, in the abstract, the advisability
of it. Before there can be a meaningful breakthrough toward even
arms control, there must be a federal agency with the authority and
the means to guarantee that no worker, no businessman, and even
no investor suffer as a result of armament agreements.
To make even a beginning requires executive leadership of the
highest order, for foreign policy depends on executive leadership,
and the inflexibility that executive leadership has wrought whether by exercise or by default-can only be corrected by executive leadership. This will take time. But even more than time, it will
require wisdom and courage. For if public opinion cannot be
moved without leadership, leadership often sees itself bound by
public opinion. And, of course, a leader without followers is no
leader at all. Yet, given the will, wise and courageous leadership
could do a number of things almost at once without risking a
head-on collision with public rigidity.
Such leadership could, for instance, begin honestly to acquaint
the American people with the great danger they face in the present
nuclear impasse,
Such leadership could undertake cautiously to convince the
American people that the Soviet Union is not necessarily militarily
aggressive; that compromises are both possible and necessary;
that while the cold war does not have to be "lost" neither can it
be "won."
Such leadership could accept openly and honestly the goal of
complete thermonuclear disarmament and devote all efforts to
creating an international climate that would make agreement on
it more, rather than less, likely.
Such leadership could explain to the American people that the
real danger from communism lies in an unrealistic approach to
social revolution in underdeveloped countries and that it cannot be
combated by military force, but only by a new attitude toward
revolutionary regimes.
Such leadership could begin to show the American people the

futility and disadvantage of constant challenge to the Soviet Union
on Eastern Europe.
Such leadership could insist on caution in public statements
and insure that they be neither misleading, inflammatory, nor
provocati~e.~~
Such leadership could initiate at private, official levels detailed
confidential proposals for compromises on Berlin, disengagement
of military forces, and curtailment of American bases abroad so
as to stimulate official thinking along these lines and have plans
ready for possible use.
Such leadership could initiate plans for easing the economic
problems that curtailment of arms production might bring to
many individuals and firms and thus diminish the built-in psychological barrier to disarmament that exists in the United States.
Such leadership could begin to persuade the American people
that a disarmament agreement would not be really meaningful
unless it included all major powers, including Communist China.
It goes without saying that all such steps would be of little avail
unless at the same time we see to it that our own system works at
home-economically, politically, and socially. For if we can both
survive and also insure that the great American ideals of peace and
freedom and equality and well-being shine once more like a beacon
through all the world, then indeed will communism have to look
to its laurels.

October 1961

56. There is indication that President Kennedy has attempted this, at least in
regard to military personnel.
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